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Like many socialist  countries  in transition, Hungary  must find
a way to reduce the fiscal burden implicit in the subsidized
housing  loan  portfolio  inherited  from the  pre-  1989  regime. The
paper discusses  different ways of dealing with this portfolio
during the transition toward a more efficient and equitable
system.
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Sagari and Chiquier examine alternatives for  Sagari and Chiquier propose a general
dealing with the initial conditions of housing  approach to finding options to reduce the fiscal
finance facing countries making the transition to  burden implicit in the subsidized housing loan
a market econorrmy  and moving toward a more  portfolio inherited from the pre-1989 regime.
efficient and equitable system.  They identify mechanisms to reduce the interest
subsidy embodied in that portfolio as well as
The authors focus on the problem of restruc-  mechanisms to spread the associated losses
turing the stock of housing loans that exist at the  among those benefiting from the subsidies as
time a new regime is implemented.  Almost  well as among other parties.  Clearly any "re-
without exception the stock of housing loans is  sidual" subsidy must be absorbed by the govern-
yielding heavily subsidized rates, ar,' its market  ment and ultimately by the population in the
value is significantly below its book value.  form of increased taxation or decreased avail-
ability of public services.
Hungary makes an interesting case study.
The mortgage portfolio inherited from past  The problem is complex and no obvious,
regimes - and the nature of the measures  easily implementable solutions emerge.  But
adopted to deal with the fiscal and institutional  delaying action could hardly improve the situa-
problems resulting from the old regimes - tion.
makes especially clear the perverse implications
of housing finance systems based on across-the-
board subsidized interest rates.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank. An objective of the series
is to get these  findings out quickly, even if presentations are Iess than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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I.  Introduction
One of the current centrai concerns in financial  sector analysis and policy is the
widespread insolvency  of financial  intermediaries. Restructuring  of these institutions  and their
portfolios has now become  a priority task in a vast number  of countries throughout  the world.
Housing finance institutions  are no exception.
Most of the existing literature in the area of restructuring  of housing finance institutions
refers to the savings and loans' (S&Ls)  case in the United  States. 2 Some materials have also
been produced in connection  with the privatization  of housing in England. Work in the case of
developing  countries has focused  mainly on assessing  the dimension  of the problems 3; available
literature on the analysis of "work-out" strategies,  however, is minimal.
On the basis of the Hungarian  experience,  this paper discusses  different approaches  for the
treatment  of initial housing finance conditions  in the process of transition  toward a more efficient
and equitable  system.  The central issue in the analysis is the restructuring  of the stock of housing
loans existing at the time of design and implementation  of a ne".' regime. Almost without
exception,  such stock is yielding  heavily subsidized  interest rates, and its market value is
significantly  below its book value.  In a large number  of cases, this is the most important  single
factor leading to the technical  insolvency  of the institution  holding the port.olio.  Further, housing
financial  systems based on across-the-board  subsidized  interest rates are bound to be unsustainable
from a budget  perspective, and regressive from an income distribution  viewpoint. 4 In fact, the
very poor are generally  likely to be renters, and not owners, and consequently  poor families will
get the smallest  share of credit subsidies.
Needless to say, this problem and its macroeconomic  implications  are not confined  to
reforming socialist  economies. Apart fiom the notorious  S&Ls case in the United States, many
other countries have experienced  serious problems  with their housing financial  system; Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Phi:.ppines,  Jamaica, Turkey are among the most critical examples
IIndustry  and  Energy  Operations,  Sahelian  Department  and  consultant,  respectively.  The views  and  interpretations  in this  document  are
those  of the  authors  and  should  not  be attributed  to the  World Bank  Group  or to any individual  acting  in their  behalf. Thanks  are due  to Mike
Atkin, Bob  Buckley,  Tim Condon,  Joanna  Elliott,  Christine  Kessides,  Geoffrey  Nicholson  and Bertrand  Renaud  for useful  commnents,  and to
Bo Wang  for research  assistance.
2  See,  for example,  Kane  (1985), Weicher  (1987), Silverberg  (1990), and White  (1991).
3Foxlcy (1977) and Renaud  (1988) discuss  some  asp.cts  of  lthe Chilean  case. Buckley  (1988) looks  at the  case  of Argentina.
4  See  Daniel (1985)  for an analysis  of the  redistributive  effects  of housing  state  subsidies  in Hungary,  Renaud  (1988) for  an analysis  of
the case  of Chile,  and  Renaud  (1989) for an overall  discussion  of the main  issues  in housing  finance  in development.2
[Renaud (1988)]. In the last two decades, Chile for example, suffered two crises in its housing
financial  system; one in 1975/76,  the second between 1983 and 1986. In both cases, the
government was forced to intervene, purchasing  financial  assets related tu,  housing  and real state
financing. However, as shown by the case of Hungary studied  here, it is the dimensions  of
subsidized  mortgage  credit in socialist  economies  in transition what makes the issue a focal point
in the process of reform.
The Hungarian  case also provides  a vivid illustration  of the potential  difficulties
encountered  in dealing with these problems, difficulties  stemming  from the economic and social
ramifications  of housing finance. Facing a legacy of subsidized  mortgage credits, the Polish
Parliament quickly approved  the extreme  and drastic solution  of re-writing all existing housing
loan contracts to eliminate  subsidies. But it took nearly three years of analysis and discussions
before the Hungarian  authorities  could design a proposal that would  be acceptable  to Parliament.
Other reforming socialist  economies  may have to face a similar ordeal.  Section It of this paper
presents the origins, dimensions  and implications  of the problem of the subsidized  housing loan
portfolio  in Hungary.  Section III analyzes options to deal with this problem.  Section IV presents
conclusions.'
H.  Housing Finance in Hungary in the 1980s
A.  Overview
As in many other countries, in Hungary the issue of the availability  of housing has been a
major concern for a long time.  In the past, housing in the cities and larger towns was typically
produced  and managed  in the socialist  sector by large construction  enterprises and local councils;
rural housing remained  mostly in the private sector.  More recently, since 1983, the focus of
State support for housing shifted from construction  and management  of State-owned  units to direct
financial  assistance  to families  for private construction. For clarity purposes, it is useful to divide
the decade  - wo periods: before, and after 1989.
The  re-1989  Housing Financial  System The housing financial  system established  by the
Housing Act of 1983 and in place until December  31, 1988 led to the accumulation  of a stock of
housing loans at increasingly  subsidized  interest rates.  Up to that point, housing loans were
financed  by captive  deposits from the household  sector which, as per the system in place, had no
alternative financial  intermediary  to deposit or borrow from.  Both lending and borrowing rates
were administratively  set.  Loans were granted with maturities  of up to 35 years, and interest
rates were fixed for the life of the loan.  As of December  31, 1988 such stock amounted to Ft
274 billion (approximately  $ 5.3 billion) and was equivalently  to approximately  20% of 1988
5 The statistical  analysis  was  carried  out with figures  available  as  of April  1990,  when the first  version  of this  paper  was  prepared.  Data
up to December  1989  were provided by the National Planning  Office.  All other figures,  unless  otherwise  specified,  have  resulted  from  the
authors'  projections,  estimations  and simulations.3
GDP (Ft 1,418 billion). 67 The average rate on the portfolio was 3.2%.
Until late 1987, infl2?ion  was low, and the difference  between interest rates on deposits
and interest rates on loans was positive but not significant. The losses resulting from the interest
rate differential  were absorbed by the budget.  In 1987, these losses amounted to  Ft 11 billion.
In 1988, due to increased inflation, the banking system  had to raise initerest  rates on deposits.
Gross interest increased to 14.2%.  The interest subsidy  accrued during the period was of Ft 31
billion or 2.2% of GDP. 8 These subsidies  were granted with little consideration  to performance
or need.  To the tremendous  negative impact of the subsidized  portfolio  on the fiscal accounts,
one must then add the negative implications  in terms of income redistribution.
Housing Finance Reform 9 As of January 1, 1989, the housing financial  system was
reformed.  Among the most important  aspects of the reform was the elimination  of interest rate
subsidies. The new loan mortgages  carry market rates, and the borrower receives a subsidy  equal
to a predetermined  percentage  of the monthly  payments, directly from the budget.  Also, a
Housing Fund was created which took over the ownership  of the total stock of subsidized  loans
granted by the National Savings Bank (NSB)  and the savings cooperatives,  in exchange for long-
term bonds. However, the bonds are nothing  more than an accounting  entry in the books of the
participating  institutions. The loans continue to be managed  by the institutions  that originally
granted them.  The Housing Fund is formally  part of the central government,  and as such its
finances are directly part of the fiscal budget.
The "loans for bonds" swap left untouched  the impact  on the fiscal accounts of the
mismatch  between the costs of the sources financing  the loan portfolio  and the portfolio yields.
Moreover, since the bonds for which the loans were swapped  yield an interest tied to NSB
average  cost of funds' 0, and indirectly to the deposit rates, the authorities  saw the need to put a
6  In Chile,  as of December  1987.  and after the 1983/86  crisis of the housing rinancial system, the subsidized  loan portfolio  amounted
to approximately the equivalent of  US$ 330 million, or 0.2% of the 1987 GDP (Source: Central Bank of Chile).  In Argentina. by the second
half of the 1980s, financial assistance to the National Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional) was cquivalent to some 20% of the Central
Bank's quasi-fiscal deficit [Renaud (1989)].
7  From the total  portfolio of Ft 274 billion, loans granted by the National Savings Bank account for Ft 260 billion.  'Te  remaining Ft
14 billion correspond  to loans extended by more than 260 savings cooperatives.  Overall, some 2.6 million accounts are estimated to be covered
by the operation.  Of these, some  1.8 million correspond to loans at rates not higher than 4%.
8  In  1989 in Poland interest rate subsidies on the outstanding housing loan portfolio were est:mated to  represent  1.5% of the national
budget.
9 We discuss here exclusively the  aspecis relevant to the stot;k of loais granted before 1989. For an in-depth discussion of overall housing
policy reform in  Hungary see Hegedus and Tosics (1990).
10 The annual yield of NSB housing loans and bonds was agreed to be al least equal to the  average cost of funds, calculated as the average
cost of the interest bearing liabilities including depos;s,  borrowing,  and bonds issued by the institution, plus a spread of 3%.4
ceiling on these rates."  For as lorig  as these ceilings lasted, they put serious limitations  to the
effective  integration of the household  and enterprise financial  systems as well as to the ability of
all financial  intermediaries  to mobilize  deposits  from the population  to finance productive  sector
growth.' 2
Very much aware of the perverse implications  of the maintenance  of the subsidized
portfolio, over the cotirse of 1988, 1989 and 1990  the Hungarian  authorities  searched for and
explored  different alternatives  to deal with the problem.  The implicit  financial, social and
political  difficulties,  delayed the adoption  of a solution until December 1990.
B.  The Subsidized Portfolio:  Profile and Dynamics
Figure 1 shows  the expected  evolution  of the portfolio of subsidized  loans outstanding  as
of January 1, 1989, and its average interest rate under the assumption  that the original loan
contracts remain intact.' 3 Estimates  of the interest subsidies  implicit in the portfolio and their
relationship  to GDP are presented in Figure 2.  The calculations  were based on assumptions  on
the evolution of key macroeconomic  indicators  and associated  projections  for the rates applicable
to the Housing Fund bonds (Table 1).  For 1989, actual interest rate subsidic.;  amounted  to
approximately  Ft 40 billion, equivalent to near 2.5% of GDP.
11 As of June  1990, ceilings on interest rates on household  deposits  were:  (i) 22%, before taxes,  for deposits for less than 1 year, and
(ii) 26% before taxes, for deposits for terms longer than or equal to one year but shorter than 3 years.  Deposits for 3 years or more were not
subject to ceilings.  Rates on these deposits oscillated around 27-28% before taxes.  Inflation for the  12 month period ending June  1990 was
running at about 27%.  Ceilings on interest rates on household depositsof  longer than six months' maturity were removed as of January  1, 1991.
12 The adverse impact that acministratively set rates might have had on deposit mobilization is supponted by preliminary egtiniates in Blejer
and Sagari (1991), who found that in the last few years financial savings in  Hungary have become sensitive to the real level of inter  at rates.
13  Information on the subsidized portfolio was limited to maturity structure and interest rates,  and was available only for loans granted
by  N"3.  These  represent 95% of the total portfolio;  data  for the total portfolio were thus  estimated as directly proportional to those of NSB.
Data  ..olders of the subsidized loans (i.e.,  distribution by level of income, age or geographic area) were not available.5
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TABLE I
AwnV(ioas  on the Evolution of Key Macroeconomic  Indicators
and Housing Fund Bond Rates
Years:  195  1959  1990  1e-  I9  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  199  I99  2000  2001  2002  203  2004 CP|(a)  15.7  17  19.5  15  12  10  8  7  6  5  5  5  5  5  5  _  5 CostFunds  (b)  14  21.5  17  '4  12  t0  9  S  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 BondRate  (c)  18  25.5  21  is  16  14  13  12  I  I  I  I I  11  I  II  if  II GDP  (d)  1418  1705  2020  2317  2614  2917  3203  3487  3762  4051  4370  4720  5104  5520  5970  6456  695 GDP nonmnal  (e)  20.2  1.5  14.7  12.8  11.6  9.8  3.9  7.9  7.7  7.9  3.0  3.3  8.2  8.2  8.2  3.2 GDP  real  (1)  2.77  -0.86 -0.26  0.73  1.45  1.67  1.74  1.78  2.55  2.74  2.37  299  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00
Years:  2005  2006  2007  2003  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2036  2017  2013  219  20.19  2021  CPI(a)  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 CostFunds  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  1 BondRate  11  it  I  L  I  I  I I  11  I  I I  I  I|II  I  I  I  II  I  11  3  1  II  11 GDP (d)  7552  8167  8533  95'3  1M31  11173  12034  13069  14134  15236  16531  17t79  9336  20Q12  22646  24459  26453 GDP nominal  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.2  3.2  8.2  3.2  3.2  3.2  8.2  8.2  3.2  5  .2  3.2  3.2  8.2  3.2 GDP rea  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  3.00  |  3.00  3-00  3.00  3.00  3.00
Yeatr  2022  2023  2024  2025
CMI(a)  5  5  5  5
CostFund  7  7  7  7
BondRate  II  II  11 II
GDP (d)  23603  30940  133462  36139
GDP n  a  3.2  3.2  3.2  2  .2
GDP  1ea  3.00  3.00  3.01  3.00
Notes:  (a)  Consme  Pnce Index in S
(b)  Aubor'  estimates, amed  to be equal in chbnge  in CPI plus  2% (except  ror  1959) (c)  Audwr.  estinte,  aumed  to be equl  to cos  of finds plus 4% (3O%  ral  yield plus 1  of management fee) (d)  In Billion Fodata
(e)  GDP erowh  (in  ) in nomnnol  terms
(M  *  P gowth  (in  %)in e  tenms8
During 1989  the authorities  also granted a 45% "di.scount"  for prepayment  of outstanding
balances. The offered discount  was less than the discount implicit  in thc subsidies  and
consequently,  if the optioin  were to be accepted it could have resulted in a ne.t  gain for the
budget.4 Eiowever,  because at the moment  of the swap it was agreed that the Housing Fund
borids  were to be redeemed  pari passu.  with the collection  or the loans for which they were
swapped, the prepayment  scheme resulted in additional  expenditures  for the housing Fund  eolial to
the difference  between the oollections  and the total nominal  valuie  of the Housing sund bonds to be
redeemed--i.e., Ft 12 billion.  As a consequence,  in 1989 interest and discount-related
expenditure from the stock of subsidized  mortgage  credit amountzd to Ft 51 billion, eqnivalent to
3% of GDP.'-
The nigh level of the projected  interest subsidies  (in particular those for the period 1990-
1995) raised serious concerns at oLt the possibility for the budget to absorb the corresponding
losses.  But the problem was potentially  worse.  First, these figures were based on a somewhat
optimistic scenario for the evolution  of inflation in Hungary over that period.  Further, interest
losses from the portfolio  are very sensitive  to the cost of funds for NSB, which is signiticantly
determined  by deposit rates, and ultimately, by the evolution  of domestic prices.  If inflation were
to decrease at a slower pace than projected  in Table 1, say for example that it wer- to decrease by
1% per year until it reached 5  %, the burden of the housing  pre-1989 loan portfoiio  would increase
substantially  (Table 2 and Figure 3).  A third estimation  pictured  in Figure 4 illustrates  the case of
worseaing inflation  (Scenario  C).
These results appear, in principle, counter-intuitive. With high inflation and fixed rates,
the significance  of the subsidized  poitfolio is quickly eroded and shonld not pose any serious threat
to the budget.  However, under the system put in place in Hungary  at the time of the "loans for
bonds" swap the burden for the budget corresponding  to the interest accrued on any outstanding
housing bonds (or equivalently,  any outstanding  housin,g  portfolio) increases  rather than decreases
with inflation." 6
14 The oftered  uiscount  was in fact lower  than  the  present  value  of future  interest  subsidies,  even  under an optimistic  scenario  where
inter,  rates  decline  fairly rapidlv  in the near  future. This  wsa  clearly  one  of the factors  explaining  the less  than  enthusiastic  response  of the
population  to the 'discount' proposal.  Response  improved  when  it came  to be known  that  the  discount  would  be reduced  to 25  % in 1990,  and
that  further  measures--such  as a tax  on loans--might  be taken  to recoup  the flscal  losses  implicit  in the pre-1989  portfolio--Ft  28 billion  were
prepaid  in November  and  December  1988.
15 Because  some  Ft 12 billion  in subsidies  wer. carried  over  from 1988  to 1989, and  total subsidies  actually  paid  out  in 1989  reached
Ft 63 billion  or 3.7% of GDP.
Note  the following:  (i)  If deposit  rates  do not  fully  adjust  to compensate  for inflation,  the impact  on  the  budget  is relatively  smaller.
For  simplicity  purposes,  however,  in our  simulation  for 1990  and  onwards  we  assumed  full adjustment.  (ii)  The significance  of interest  subsidies
vis-a-vis  GDP!  depends  fur  mentally  oni  the  evolution  of GDP under  a high  inflation  scenario.9
Table 2
Alternative  Interest Rate Scenarios: Impact  on Subsidies
Year:a  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
ScenanoA(a)  25.5  21  18  16  14  13  12  11  1,  11  1  11  _  11
Scenario  B (b)  25.5  24.5  23 5  22.5  215  205  19.5  18.5  17.5  16.5  15.5  14.5
Subsidies  C (c)  54,9  40.0  30.6  24.2  18.7  25.5  12.8  10.4  9.6  8.9  8.  j  7.4
Subsidies  B (c)  54.9  47.8  41.9  36.4  31.4  27.0  23.2  20.0  i7.1  14.7  12.5  |  10.5
Yi  .s:  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  |  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013
Scenario A  I  I  1  II  II  II  I_  i  _I I1I  I  I I  I
Scenario B  13.5  ;2.5  11.5  1;  I I  I I  II  I1  11  11  I I
Subsidies A  6.7  6.1  5.4  4.8  4.2  3.6  3.1  2.6  2.1  1.6  1.1  0.7
Subsidics  B  8.7  7.2  57  4.8  4.2  3o  3.1  2.6  2.1  1.6  1.1  0.7
__  _  __  _  __  _  ___  _  __  _  _  _  _  - -
|Years  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  |  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023 1 2024  |  2025
SenarioA  I  I  I  1  11  I  II  J  I  I  I I  I I  I  11  I
ScenarioB  11  II  I1  11  I  I  I  I1  I I  I I  I  1  I  I  I  II
Subsidies  A  0.4  0.3  0.3I8  0.09  0.05  j0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Subsidies  B  0.4  0.3  0.18  0.09  0.05  0.02|0.03  0.00  0.00  0  0.00  0on|  .0
Notes:  (a)  Scenario  A:  previous optimistic scenario
(b)  Scenario B:  inflation declincs at a slower pace
(c)  in Billion Forints10
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C.  The Swap between the Housing Fund and the HMusing Financial Intermediaries
As of January 1, 1989, the housing financial  system was reformed; most importantly,
interest rate subsidies  were eliminated, and a Housing Fund was created which took over the
ownership of the total stock of subsidized  loans granted by NSB and approximately  260 savings
cooperatives, in exchange for long-term  bonds.  It was agreed between the government  and the
swapping  institutions  that these bonds would  be redeemed  pari passu with the repayment  of
principal of the housing loans.  This way, the portfolio  of bonds would have exactly the same
maturity  as the housing loan portfolio, and the bond holdings  by the participating  institutions
would evolve in parallel with the stock  of housing loans held by the Housing Fund.' 7
This "loan for bonds" swap left untouched  the impact  of the mismatch  between the costs of
the sources financing the loan portfolio and its yields both on the fiscal accounts and on the overall
process of savings mobilization  and allocation. A look at the financial  dynamics  between the
Housing Fund and the swapping  financial  intermediaries  makes explicit the remaining  perverse
implications  of effectively  maintaining  the subsidized  loan portfolio, and the need for further
policy action.
Financial  Dynamics The dynamics  of the finances  of the subsidized  portfolio  can be
described in simple terms as follows. At the end of each month, each swapping  institution  reports
to the Housing Fund the cash-flow from repayments  of housing loans, broken down into
repayment  of principal and payment  of interests. The principal repayment  is automatically  applied
to the redemption of housing bonds.  The Housing fund debits the account corresponding  to the
loans managed  by each of the financial  intermediaries  and credits the account corresponding  to the
housing  bonds held by each of them.
An analysis of the financial  transactions  and flows with actual data for 1989 is particularly
useful to shed some light on who are ultimately  the "winners"  and "losers" from the existence  of
the subsidized  portfolio.  For 1989, the total amount  corresponding  to repayment of principal of
housing loans granted amounted  to Ft 44.6 billion. Interest payments  amounted to Ft 8.0 billion.
The Ft 44.6 billion were allocated: (i) to redeem bonds (Ft 31 billion), and (ii) to finance Ft 13.6
billion promised  to be granted in the conditions  of the pre-1989 system.
The interest accrued on the total of outstanding  Housing Fund bonds outstanding  plus the
1  % management  fee amounted to Ft 48.1 billion. Additiorial  cash outflows for the Housing Fund
resulted from:
17 Th¢ Fund signed  individual contracts  with each of the swapping  rinancial  institutions.  These  contracts  indicate  the amount  of the
portfolio taken over by the Housing Fund, which gives also the amount  of bonds  to be issued  by the Fund to each institution.  As per this
contract  the financial institution  takes  the tasks  of: providing data  to the Housing  Fund, following-up  the changes  in the stock  of loans  and bonds,
and most importantly, collecting these  loans  and managing  the resulting  cash-flows.
The Housing Fund  has  a very simplified accounting  system  for its operations.  Each institution reports  to the Housing Fund  the cash-
flow from repayments  of housing  loans, broken  down into principal and interest. The Fund  then does  the corresponding  bookings. A question
emerges,  clearly, on the reliability of such  an accounting  system.  where  the ultimate holder of a portfolio of financial assets  has  practically no
mechanism  to follow-up on the individual components.13
(i)  the allowance  (discount)  offered during 1989 to promote prepayment  of the
subsidized  stock--described  before--and  which amounted to Ft 12.4 billiun-1;  and
(ii)  the i- terest subsidies  deferred from 1988, amounting  to Ft 11.9 billion.
The difference between these cash expenditures  of Ft 72.4 billion and the interest income
of Ft 8 billion, equal to negative Ft 64.4 billion was financed  as follows:
(i)  the funds from the 20% withholding  tax on household  deposit interest--Ft  7.6
billion;
(ii)  new 15-year  bond issues--Ft  19.4 billion;
(iii)  direct transfer from the budget--Ft  37.4 billion.
The new 15-year  bonds were designated  as forced investments  for the social security fund
(Ft 13.1 billion) and the commercial  banks--50%  of the before tax risk reserves, or Ft 6.3 billion
(June 1989). The bonds have a 5 year grace period for the principal which is then repaid in 10
equal installments. The interest rate has been arbitrarily set to be equal to 80% of the rate on the
longest maturity Treasury Bill, i.e., the rate on the Treasury Bill times 1 minus the withholding
tax rate on household  deposit interest income. In 1989 this computation  yielded an interest rate of
15.25% (1.25% negative  in real terms).  Currently, the rate is 19.2%.  The interest on the bonds
is accrued and paid once a year.  At the end of the calendar year, the interest accrued is computed
using the average of the rates for the period.
The above discussion  is.interesting  to underline  some political economy  issues, i.e.,  who is
actually bearing the burden of the subsidized  housing loan portfolio.  Clearly, the most important
contribution  comes from the central budget--both  in what has to do with the direct transfer, and
the lower yield in the investments  of the social security fund--, and implicitly  it is shared by all
the population.
However, there are two other "groups" that can be identified  more specifically. These are:
(i)  household  depositors, who must ultimately  take an interest income cut; and (ii) the financial
intermediaries,  which are forced to invest in instruments  yielding  a negative real rate (and a rate
that is not known until the whole calendar year has ended). As long as the amounts of the forced
investments  for the commercial  banks are not significant  the impact on their profitability  and
operation is minor. Yet, increased pressure on these intermediaries  to share the burden of the
Housing Fund deficit would introduce  new distortions  in the financial  system." 8
18 In fact, it can be easily proved that generalized use of forced investments at below market rates pushes lending rates up and/or  deposit
rates  down.  Alternatively,  if these moves are 'forbidden',  bank profitability  is adversely affected.  Giving the concerns in Hungary about the
condition of the loan portfolio  of financial intermediaries accounting for a significant share of the Hungarian financial system, measures that
decrease their profitability  should be avoided.14
III.  Analysis  of Options
A.  General  Framework
The approach adopted in the search for a solution to the problems resulting from the pre-
1989 subsidized housing loan portfolio focuses on two aspects:  (i) identification of mechanisms to
reduce the interest subsidy embodied in that portfolio;  and (ii) identification of mechanisms to
share the associated losses among (ii. 1) those benefitting from the subsidies, and (ii.2) other
parties.  Clearly,  any "residual" subsidy is absorbed by the Government and ultimately by the
population in the form of increased taxation or decreased availability of public services.
Direct beneficiaries of the interest subsidy are obviously all those with outstanding loans at
subsidized rates.  Also, because up to 1988 deposit and borrowing  rates were similar,  the total
subsidy implicit in each contract may be reasonably assumed to be an increasing function of the
time to maturity of that contract.
The evaluation of each alternative should take into consideration mainly:
- its sustainability in terms of its impact on the Government budget;
- its feasibility, in terms of its impact on the household sector;
- its impact on any other party forced to share in the losses of the subsidized
portfolio--for instance, banks or other financial intermediaries; and
- its political viability.
B.  Mechanisms to Reduce the Subsidies
Direct elimination of the interest subsidies implicit in the contracts  extended under the pre-
1989 regime could only be achieved by restructuring such contracts,  substituting market interest
rates for the currently  fixed subsidized rates.  Interest subsidies could also be reduced by
restructuring the repayment schedule in such a way that the present value of the newly contracted
payments is higher than the present value of the original payments.
It is clear,  that nobody benefitting from the subsidy would voluntarily resign all or part of
it.'9 One could think of designing an incentive program that might prompt rescheduling of
existing housing loan contracts.  Potential components of such a program could be:
(i)  making access to other financial products or services conditional on prepayment or
restructuring  of current pre-1989 subsidized mortgage contracts.  One type of such
19  Note however that the 'value'  of the subsidy may differ across different parties  (across borrowers,  or between the Government and
the borrower),  which gives room to negotiation.15
other financial  products or services would be new loans for housing which in the
context of a new housing financial  policy would be mainly addressed to the higher
income level group within the population. The new policy, to be designed and
implemented  in the near future, would allow for a variety of new instruments  or
financial  arrangements  potentially  more attractive  and suitable  to different groups
within the Hungarian  population. The novelty may be in the instrument, in the
purpose catered by the loan, or in both.  In this sense, othe: countries  have included
in similar incentive  programs housing  loans specifically  earmarked  for better quality
housing.
(ii)  linking the new mortgage  contracts to non-financial  products or services such as
access to some services to be provided  by the State (but not considered  a primary
necessity). 20
(iii)  offering  a significant  capital discount. Note however that the discounts  already
implicit  in the very highly subsidized  rates of the pre-1989 contracts were so high
that it is difficult to think of any solution, along these lines, that would not report,
at the same time significant  fiscal expenditures--in  the form of the allowance  to be
paid to NSB to maintain  the bond and the loan portfolio  at the same value. 21
Further, if implemented,  the discount should  vary across borrowers, taking into
account the age of the loans and the interest rate, since both of these aspects
determine the remaining  benefit to be derived from the loan contract.
In any case, the success of any incentive  program of this type may be very hard to predict
and the urgency to improve Government  finances may call for more immediatt and certain results.
In the specific  case of Hungary  which is the focus of this paper, "voluntary"  rescheduling  of
existing contracts in any significant  volume appeared, despite its philosophical  appeal, quite
unlikely. In this case, the only alternative  left is to determine  by law the revision  of all pre-1989
contracts. In the way of example, contracts could be rewritten according to any of the following
options:
(i)  maintaining  repayments  of principal at the same levels of the existing contracts but
increasing  the interest rate adding 2% annually until the market rate is reached;
(ii)  adoptirg a dual index mortgage (DIM) model whereby  the installments  are indexed
to the wage income of the borrower (so that the debt-service/income  ratio for the
borrower remains stable)  and the remaining  balances  are adjusted for inflation. 22
20 Note, for instance,  that linking  a financial  product--bond-to  a non-financial  service-telephone  line-was already  done in Hungary  by
the telephone  company  to promote  placement  of its bonds  in the market.
21 See the sections  above, for a discussion.
22  For a technical  and detailed  presentation  on the dynamics  of the DDU  see Chiquier  (1990).16
In this case the housing bonds could also be indexed, maintaining  the pari passu
evolution  of outstanding  loans and bonds.
In case (i), Table 3 illustrates  a possible  example of irnerest rate increases. Resulting new
estimates for cash outflows  are depicted in Figure 5.  The lower half shows the corresponding
budgetary savings, both in billions of forints and in % of GDP.  In this scenario, in 1992/93  for
example, savings in interest subsidies  would  be equivalent  to some 0.4 % of GDP.
Table 3
Progressive Rates Adjustment  Scenario
Interest Rate of Initial Contract  1990  i991  1992  1993  1994
0  2  4  6  8  11
l  3  5  7  9  11
2  4  6  8  10  11
3  5  7  9  10  11
3.5  5  7  9  10  11
4  5  7  9  10  11
6  7  8  9  10  II
8  9  10  1I  1I  11
10  10  II  II  11  11
11  11_  1I  I  11  11
12  12  12  12  12  12
13  13  13  13  13  13
14  14  14  14  - 14  14
s15  .5  15  15  i  1517
FIGURE 5
Impact  of Interest  Rate  Adjustment
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In case (ii), Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the evolution  of outstanding  loans and required
subsidies  under the assumption  that interest rates follow  the optimistic  sharp decline scenario and
that wages follow inflation. The DIM results in an acceleration  of installments  in nominal  terms.
Interest subsidies  would be required for only three years, and in an amount far smaller than the
original figures.  Further, the loans' principal--and  consequently,  the bonds' principal--would  be
totally reimbursed  after 12 years.
In case of a contract revision then, the advantages  of adopting  the DIM option are both that
it saves scarce budgetary resources, and that the problem  of the subsidized  portfolio disappears  in
the short-term. From the individual  borrowers' viewpoi'  option (i) is "cheaper" since subsidies
remain for a longer time.  However, by fixing the repa, -ne v to the wage level the DIM ensures
that (in relative terms) no additional  burden is placed on tne monthly income.
FIGURE 6
Revised  Indexed  Repayments
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C.  Loss-Sharing Mechanisms
Ideally, if contracts are not restructured, a mechanism  should be found to have those
benefitting from the subsidy absorb the corresponding  losses.  This was the aim of one of the
options explored  by the Hungarian  authorities ihi 1989: a loan tLx  applying  across-the-board  to all
those debtors with housing loans with interest rates of 4% and below.  For 1990 the tax would
equal Ft 320 per month; from 1991  onward, the tax would vary with the rate of inflation (but
would continue  to be a flat amount across loan sizes).
This proposal had the strong advantage  of being simple to implermient  and easy to collect.
However, it was regressive  in nature since it did not distinguish  among borrowers by their level of
income, and perhaps, the increase in installments  was excessively  sharp--at least in nominal  terms-
-to receive any acceptance  from the population. The option was presented to Parliament which
considered  it unconstitutional  and rejected it.
Other loss-sharing  options considered by Hungarian  experts resulted from a combination  of
factors: (i) a view that the interest rate subsidy  embodied in the pre-1989 portfolio was exclusively
a housing policy issue (rather than a combination  of housing policy, and institutional  distress and
restructuring  issues) and consequently  that interest rate subsidies  were part of a total budget for
housing subsidies;' (ii) a policy decision not to have total budget expenditures  allocated to
housing exceed a predetermined  amount; (iii) the assumption  that past contracts could not be
revised.  Within this framework, it appeared that the only alternative  available to absorb the
interest subsidies  in the pre-1989  portfolio was to cut other housing subsidies. Some of the ideas
that were considered were the elimination  of the child allowance  for any child in a family  after the
second, or of the special subsidies  for young families. These alternatives  were clearly inadequate
and deficient both from a social and an economic  viewpoint  and were never implemented.'
But perhaps the most interesting  observation  from this approach is the notion that the
interest subsidies  embodied in the pre-1989 portfolio  are part of a total budget for housing
subsidies  and that the inability to reduce them must inevitably  lead to a reduction in other housing
subsidies. To the extent that outstanding  pre-1989 contracts were seen as final, and not subject  to
revision under any circumstance,  it would  be more adequate  conceptually  to see them as subsidies
to the financial  sector--i.e., subsidies  to support financial  intermediaries  which have suffered a
very significant  loss in the market value of their assets.
Borrowers benefitting  from interest subsidies  could also be brought in to share the
associated  loss by including  in the personal income tax calculations  the income gain implicit in
23  Note however than to the extent that outstanding  pre-1989  contracts  are seen as final,  and not subject to  revision under any
circumstance,  it  knay  be more adequate  conceptually  to  see  them as subsidies  to the financial sector-i.e.,  subsidies  to support  financial
intermediaries which  have lost a significant slare of their assets,  or equivalently,  financial intermediaries  which  have suffered  a very significant
loss in the  market  value of their assets.
24  In particular,  the amounts  involved in the  proposedcut  werc extremely  smal:  as  compared  to the size  of the fiscal losses  to be  absoeoed.21
below market interest rates.  The "imputable  income" would be computed by multiplying  the
'implicit subsidy rate" times the outstanding  debt.  The implicit  subsidy rate, in turn,  could be
computed  as the difference  between the on-going  housing lending rate and the rate originally
contracted. The advantage  of this type of solution is that those borrowers in the lowest levels of
income, who in an adequately  designed subsidy system would receive financial  support, would
continue  to receive the full subsidy  since their income would not reach the minimum  taxable
amount.
Clearly this solution  is not perfect.  First, due to deficiencies  in income measuring  and
reporting in Hungary, many taxable beneficiaries  of the interest subsidy would not be reached.
Second, it is impossible  via this system to generate enough resources at the right time to relief the
burden on tne central budget: modification  of personal income tax legisiation  is a lengthy process,
the Treasury might easily have tc wait for two years before receiving  any of the additional  tax
revenues from the new system. Despite  these shortcomings,  and in particular the fact that further
complementary  measures  would need to be implemented,  this approach  is fairly equitable,
technically  sound and reasonably  easy to implement.
A final alternative  to discuss here is ihe indexation  of the Housing Fund bonds which
would allow a reduction, though only in the short-term,  of the actual fiscal expendituresi
associated  with the pre-1989  portfolio.  This alternative has a clear direct advantage  in that it
reduces fiscal expenditures  precisely at the time when budget  problems  are expected to be the most
severe--i.e., the next few years.  Additionally,  it has an indirect advantage: since a significant
share of its assets would be indexed, NSB could immediately  start to offer indexed deposits
without  automatically  incurring  any significant  risky asset mismatch. Further, it is the
international  experience that, in cases of moderate  inflation, indexation  strongly contributes  to
improve the process of deposit mobilization,  which would be desirable in the Hungarian  context.
Implementation  of this solution  would require that a new agreement be *eached  between the
central Government  and NSB 26 in terms of the cash-flows  to be received from the Housing Fund.
One possible option along these lines would be as follows:
(i)  the Housing Fund bonds would  be indexed to the  nflation  rate, and would yield a real
interest rate of, for example, 5%  .2
(ii)  NSB would be guaranteed  an amount of bond redemption  equal to that in the current
system, i.e., equal to the repayment  of principal in the stock of pre-1989 loans.  This is
important  because it would allow NSB to gradually free the resources invested in the
Housing Fund bond portfolio.
23  In terms of cash-flow.
26  Let us for simplicity ignore here the case  of the  260 savings  cooperatives.
This value is similar to that of the yield as  of the  time of this report.22
Table 4 and Figure 10 show the results of a simulation  on these basis.  As indicated  before,
Housing Furd outflows  are considerably  reduced in the immediate  short-term. Clearly, the overall
problem does not disappear  but is transferred into the future via the stock of indexed  bonds.
These represent  a big legacy of domestic  debt that will have to be repaid.  In due time, the
authorities should be able to adequately  dispose of state-owned  assets, and generate funds to
reduce bring the debt to reasonable  levels.  Ultimately,  the resources can only come from a
growing economy, and a strong budget condition.
D.  The Hungarian  Solution
After nearly three years of studies,  analysis, and discussions,  the Hungarian  authorities  and
experts finally found and agreed on a "solution"  to deal with the subsidized  mortgage  portfolio
inherited from the pre-1989 housing financial  system.  By December 1990, with the approval of
the Budget  Law the Hungarian  Parliament  also approved  a proposal thereby contained  by which
holders of subsidized  housing loans had to choose between:
(i)  accepting  an increase to 15% in the interest rate attached to their housing loans for
1991, with future interest rates also administratively  set taking into consideration
interest rates levels; or
(ii)  being granted an immediate  50% principal write-off and, simultaneously,  having  the
outstanding  balances yield market rates.
In both cases, additional  payments  resulting  from the modification  in the original contracts
were constrained  to a maximum  of Ft 1500 per mon.h per borrower.  Information  was not
available  at the time of this work on the options selected by the Hungarians.23
Table 4
Indexation  of Bonds Principal
Years (Jan  Ist)  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Present  System
Total Portfolio  274.0  245.1  223.2  204.9  186.8  169.6  1'4.0  139.7  127.0  115.5  106.3  97.4
Installments  37.6  29.5  25.2  24.4  22.9  20.6  18.8  16.7  15.0  12.2  11.8  11.1
-->Interests:  8.7  7.6  6.9  6.3  5.7  5.1  4.5  4.0  3.5  3.1  2.8  2.6
-->Pincipal  28.9  21.9  18.3  18.1  17.2  15.6  14.3  12.7  11.5  9.2  8.9  8.5
With Indexation,
Interests Paid  (a)  12.3  13.7  14.9  16.0  16.9  17.6  18.3  19.0  19.5  20.2  21.0
Outstanding  Principal
in nominal  termns  (b):  245.1  273.1  298.9  319.6  337.6  352.4  366.3  379.2  390.5  404.7  420.1
in real terms  245.1  217.9  196.8  178.4  162.4  148.7  136.8  126.4  117.3  109.5  102.4
Subsidies  (c)  4.6  5.2  5.8  6.3  6.8  7.3  7.8  8.5  9.1  9.4  9.7
Years  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012
Present  System
Total Portfolio  88.9  80.9  73.0  65.3  57.7  50.3  43.8  37.3  31.2  25.2  19.2  13.4
Installments  10.4  10.1  9.6  9.3  9.0  7.9  7.6  7.1  6.9  6.7  6.4  5.5
->Inteiests:  2.4  2.2  2.0  L.8  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.0  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.4
- ->Principal:  8.0  7.9  7.7  7.6  7.5  6.5  6.4  6.1  6.0  6.0  5.9  5.2
With Indzxation,
interests  :  21.8  22.7  23.7  24.8  25.9  27.0  28.3  29.7  31.2  32.8  34.4  36.2
nominal debt:  436.8  455.0  474.4  495.2  517.3  540.9  566.8  594.4  624.0  655.4  688.7  724.2
real debt  95.9  90.9  84.6  79.5  74.8  70.5  66.6  62.9  59.5  56.3  53.3  50.5
Subsidies  :  10.1  10.5  11.0  11.4  11.9  12.4  12.9  13.4  13.9  14.4  14.9  15.0
Notes:  (a):  On the indexed  outstanding  principal, interest  rate: 5%
(b):  if P(t) represents  this nominal outstanding  indexed  debt  at year t, and I(t) the market  interest  rates  at date  t (here  the scenario
A of bond rates),  then:
P(t+ 1)= P(t) *  (I +lftl)  - interests(t)  - Repayments  of Principal under  present  System.
I (a)  5% * P(t) 
(c):  Subsidies  just compensate  :he differences  of intcrest  rates  between  the Average  Rate of corresponding  Portfolio and these  5%:
the low initial subsidies  result  of this indirect recapitalization  of interests.24
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IV.  Conclusions
This paper has looked  at different alternatives  to deal with initial housing finance conditions
in the process o. transition toward a more efficient and equitable  system. The central issue in the
analysis has been the restructuring  of the stock of housing loans  existing at the time and
implementation  of the new regime.  Almost without  exception, such stock is yielding  heavily
subsidized  rates, and its market value is significantly  below its book value.
The case of Hungary is particularly  interesting. The significance  of the mortgage  portfolio
inherited fi-om  past regimes, as well as the nature of the early measures  adopted to deal with the
resulting fiscal and institutional  problems make especially  clear the perverse implications  of
housing financial  systems based on across-the-board  subsidized  interest rates.
This paper proposes a general approach to the search of options to reduce the burden to the
fiscal accounts  implicit in the subsidized  housing loan portfolio  inherited from the pre-1989
system. The approach focuses on two aspects: (i) the identification  of mechanisms  to reduce the
interest subsidy  embodied in that portfolio; and (ii) the identification  of mechanisms  to share the
associated  losses among those benefitting  from the subsidies  as well as other parties.  Clearly, any
"residual" subsidy  is to be absorbed by the Government  and ultimately  by the population  in the
form of increased taxation  or decreased  availability  of public services.
The problem is very complex  and there are no solutions  that are obvious and easy to
implement. Yet, delaying  action could hardly improve the situation. In the case of Hungary, the
most appealing  alternative  would have been to reduce the losses via a voluntary rescheduling  of
the contracts. This was in fact one of the options given to the population. Alternatively,  pre-1989
borrowers would be granted an immediate  50% principal write-off  and have an automatic
adjustment  of rates on their outstanding  balances to market levels.  Details were not available at
the time of this work on the decisions  made by the Hungarians;  however, preliminary  evidence
indicates  that the vast majority  chose the second option.  It remains to be analyzed what is the
short-term  impact on fiscal finances of the significant  principal write-off. We leave this analysis
to future work in this area.26
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